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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Does Cultural Distance Hinder Trade in Goods?
A Comparative Study of Nine OECD Member Nations
Bedassa Tadesse & Roger White
# Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2008
Abstract We examine the effect of cultural distance, a proxy for the lack of a
minimum reservoir of trust necessary to initiate and complete trade deals, on
bilateral trade flows. Employing data for 67 countries that span the years 1996–
2001, we estimate a series of modified gravity specifications and find that cultural
dissimilarity between nations has an economically significant and consistently
negative effect on aggregate and disaggregated trade flows; however, estimated
effects vary in magnitude and economic significance across measures of trade and
our cohort of OECD reference countries. The consistently negative influence of
cultural distance indicates that policymakers may wish to consider mechanisms that
enhance the build-up of trust and commitment when seeking to facilitate the
initiation and completion of international trade deals. Our findings also imply that
coefficient estimates from related studies that do not account for the trade-inhibiting
effect of cultural distance may be biased.
Keywords Cultural distance . Gravity . Immigration . Trade
JEL Classification F14 . F15 . F22
1 Introduction
Using data from the World Values Surveys and the European Values Surveys, we
employ a relatively new measure of cultural distance between countries to examine
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the relationship between cultural differences and international trade in goods. Prior
studies that have examined the determinants of trade flows have generally given
little attention to the effects of cultural differences; having instead treated cultural
dissimilarity as a component of a more broadly-defined set of transaction costs,
commonly represented by variables that measure geographic distance between
trading partners or that identify commonality of language and/or colonial ties.
Despite plausible correlations between cultural differences and these variables,
common language and colonial ties are, at best, imperfect representations of cultural
similarity. Transportation cost—as represented by geographic distance—are also not
synonymous with transaction costs. For example, while Mexico and Canada are
located at comparable geographic distances from the US, there exists significant
disparity in the cultural distance between the US and Mexico as compared to the
corresponding distance between the US and Canada, even when accounting for
(un)commonality of languages. The resulting implication is that transaction costs
that are related to cultural differences between trading partners may not be fully or
accurately represented by geographic distance or by variables that represent either
prior colonial relationships or linguistic dissimilarity.
Following Deardorff (2004), we argue that observed transaction costs do not fully
explain variation in cross-border trade flows and postulate that cultural dissimilarity
between nations inhibits international trade. As such, the objective of our research
and corresponding contribution to the literature is two-fold: (1) to evaluate the effect
of differences in the shared norms and values of people in different countries (i.e.,
cultural distance) on bilateral trade flows, and (2) to examine potential variation in
the effects of cultural distance on trade using data from nations with heterogeneous
socio-economic characteristics. To this end, we define a nation’s culture as an
amalgam of its population’s shared habits and traditions, learned beliefs and
customs, attitudes, norms and values. Cultural dissimilarity between nations thus
corresponds to social and institutional dissimilarity and/or information asymmetries
and serves as a proxy for the lack of trust and commitment necessary to initiate trade
deals and to complete transactions. Our empirical analysis explores this relationship
using data that span the years 1996–2001 for a panel of nine OECD member
countries, namely Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden and the US, and 58 other countries for which data on cultural
distance are available.1
Our study is relevant to the literature for the following reasons. First, a consensus
is lacking among studies that consider the effect of cultural distance on trade. Guiso
et al. (2005) reports a positive relationship between cultural distance and trade, while
Tadesse and White (2007), Linders et al. (2005) and Boisso and Ferrantino (1997)
report that greater cultural distance inhibits trade. These studies are discussed in
detail in “Section 2”. Second, owing to global economic integration and the
increased fragmentation of production processes, a large number of firms now rely
on production chains that straddle politically-and culturally-dissimilar nations.
Understanding how cultural dissimilarities between people in different nations may
affect the successful completion of transactions is thus desirable. Third, driven in
1 “Appendix 1” provides a listing of the countries in our data set.
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part by the burgeoning frequency of Internet-based transactions, the volume of
international trade is on the rise. Given that parties involved in Internet-based
transactions often have little recourse to formal courts of law to enforce obligations
(especially when they reside in different countries), understanding the influence of
cultural dissimilarity on trade flows is both topical and important.
While our selection of a socio-economically heterogeneous cohort of OECD
countries allows evaluation of whether the effect of cultural differences on trade is
consistent across countries, it also permits consideration of whether the effect of
cultural distance on trade persists when accounting for any pro-trade effects of
immigrants. Gould (1994), using data for the US, first documents a positive effect
of immigrants on bilateral trade flows, and more recent studies have confirmed an
immigrant-trade link for several other immigrant host countries. White and Tadesse
(2007) provide a review of the immigrant-trade literature. Our results, obtained from
the estimation of a series of modified gravity specifications, consistently indicate that
cultural dissimilarities do indeed influence cross-border trade flows. We contend that
the observed negative relationship results from a lack of the necessary trust and
commitment required for initiating and completing trade deals. In addition to
confirming the robustness of our results, the consistency of the observed effect of
cultural differences on trade across our group of heterogeneous reference countries
indicates a possible need for policymakers to consider mechanisms that enhance the
build-up of trust and commitments to facilitate the initiation and completion of
international trade deals. We also document that immigrants have economically
significant pro-trade effects; however, their ability to offset the trade-inhibiting
effects of cultural dissimilarity is limited. Finally, our findings imply that coefficient
estimates from related studies that do not account for the effect of cultural distance
may be biased.
The paper proceeds as follows. In “Section 2”, we outline the plausible
relationships between cultural distance and trade while reviewing the relevant
literature. In “Section 3”, we present the empirical model and data, while placing
particular emphasis on the measurement of cultural distance. “Section 4” discusses
the econometric results, while “Section 5” concludes.
2 Review of related literature
The literature examining the relationship between cultural distance and trade can be
considered sparse. Tadesse and White (2007), Guiso et al. (2005), Linders et al.
(2005), and Boisso and Ferrantino (1997) are notable exceptions, yet among these
studies there is no consensus regarding the effect of cultural distance on trade. While it
is difficult to discern definite reasons for the lack of consensus, the variation in results
across the available studies appears to be driven, in part, by the use of different
measures of cultural dissimilarity between trading partners and from the examination
of different cohorts of trading partners over a variety of time periods. In this section,
we summarize the findings of the available literature and, in doing so, illustrate why
the effect of cultural distance on trade remains an open empirical question.
Employing Hofstede’s (1980) four-dimensional measure of national culture and
bilateral trade data between 92 countries for the year 1999, Linders et al. (2005) report
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that greater cultural distance corresponds with higher volumes of trade. The authors
suggest that their findings may indicate that firms prefer to serve culturally-distant
markets via exporting rather than by producing in such countries. Using the measure
of cultural distance provided by Hofstede (1980) and a composite index of cultural
distance developed by Kogut and Singh (1988), Larimo (2003) also indicates that as
greater cultural differences between countries correspond with greater differences in
firms’ organizational and management practices, firms might find it difficult and costly
to transfer home country practices to subsidiaries in culturally-dissimilar locales.
Likewise, Barkema et al. (1997), Agarwal (1994) and Anderson and Gatignon (1996)
all posit that cultural dissimilarity between firms’ home countries and their potential
subsidiary locations affects their foreign investment decisions.
Greater cultural distance may also correspond with institutional dissimilarity
between nations. Hence, the lack of incentives to invest in culturally-distant
environments may have more to do with dissimilarities in institutions that govern
firms’ operations than with cultural differences. Thus, while the choice of firms to
export rather than invest in culturally/institutionally different markets may indicate a
plausible positive correlation between exports and cultural distance, by obstructing
the initiation and realization of business deals cultural distance may also, ultimately,
limit the amount of trade (Neal 1998; Campbell et al. 1988; Graham et al. 1988).
Guiso et al. (2005) use survey data to construct a measure of relative trust based on
respondents’ stereotypes of foreign nationals (a proxy for cultural differences) and
examine data for 16 EU member countries during the years 1970–1996. The authors
conclude that lower levels of trust between countries diminish the frequency and
magnitude of international trade, portfolio investment and foreign direct investment.
Thus, when viewed from the perspective of a firms’ strategic choice of serving a
culturally-different foreign market, it is plausible to say that exports would rise with
increases in cultural distance. However, as it may hinder the development of rapport
and the creation of trust required to complete trade deals, an increase in cultural
distance could also reduce the likelihood that transactions will occur, and subject to
their occurrence, the amount of trade taking place.
While not explicitly taking language as representative of cultural similarity, a
number of empirical studies have used dummy variables to indicate commonality of
language across trading partners and, as such, have indirectly employed linguistic
similarity as a measure of cultural similarity (e.g., Dunlevy 2006; Hutchinson 2002).
Such studies consistently report a positive relationship between shared languages
and trade flows. Somewhat similarly, Boisso and Ferrantino (1997) employ an index
of linguistic distance as a proxy for cultural differences and estimate gravity
specifications, for each year, during the 1960–1985 period. Supporting the notion of
a negative relationship between cultural differences and trade, the authors report that
greater linguistic dissimilarity corresponds with decreased trade flows. Further, they
also report that the trade-inhibiting effects of cultural distance increased in
magnitude until the early 1970s and then began to decrease thereafter, with the
trade-inhibiting influence of linguistic dissimilarity remaining negative and
significant throughout the period.
Using data from the World Values Surveys (WVS) and the European Values
Surveys (EVS), Tadesse and White (2007) construct a measure of cultural distance
and examine its effects on US state-level exports to 75 trading partners during the
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year 2000. The authors report that greater cultural differences consistently reduce
aggregate exports as well as exports of both cultural and non-cultural products;
however, the influence of cultural distance is found to vary across goods
classifications, with exports of cultural products affected to a greater extent. While
we employ the same measure of cultural distance, our study extends the literature in
several ways. First, we consider the influence of cultural distance on trade (both
imports and exports) for a broader set of countries. Second, we employ data that
both represent a more-detailed set of trade measures and that span a lengthier time
period. Third, we examine the consistency of the effect of cultural distance on trade
across a set of nine OECD reference countries. In the next section, we first present
the theoretical framework and empirical specification that permits evaluation of the
relationship between cultural distance and trade flows and then discuss the data
while placing particular focus on the measurement of cultural distance.
3 The theoretical framework, empirical model and the data
In developing our empirical model, we build upon the gravity framework first
employed by Tinbergen (1962) and for which Anderson (1979) provides theoretical
foundations. In its basic form, the gravity model posits that trade between two
countries i and j during year t
~
Tijt
 
increases with the countries’ combined economic
mass, which is given as the product of the countries’ incomes (YitYjt). Higher incomes
imply greater capacities for both country i and country j to either import or export.
Greater geodesic distance (GDij), which serves as a proxy for transportation costs, is
assumed to decrease trade. Adding k as the constant of proportionality, we can express
the basic gravity model as follows:
Tijt ¼ k YitYjtGDij
 
ð1Þ
From Eq. 1, we derive our econometric specification by defining Tijt as country i’s
trade (exports or imports) with country j during year t as a function of the trading
partners’ incomes, geodesic distance and other factors that may inhibit trade (formal
and informal barriers to trade) or facilitate trade (trade agreements, common
language, adjacency, immigrant stock, etc.). Given our assumption that observed
transaction costs do not fully explain cross-border trade flows (Deardorff, 2004), we
augment the theoretical gravity model with a measure of cultural distance (CDij) that
reflects the degree to which shared norms and values among people in each of our
OECD reference countries (country i) differ from those in each country j.
Effectively, we employ our measure of cultural distance to account for unobserved
transaction costs that result from the lack of a minimum reservoir of trust and
commitments between trading partners. To account for other trade-facilitating/
inhibiting factors that are often discussed in the literature, we also append the vector
Zij to Eq. 1. Equation 2 illustrates.
Tijt ¼ k
Y g1it Y
g2
jt
GDg3ij
 !
exp CDg4ij b
0Zij
 
ð2Þ
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Equation 2 predicts strictly positive realizations of imports and exports; however,
trade data often contain cases where values are equal to zero. Following Ranjan and
Tobias (2005), Eaton and Tamura (1994) and Head and Ries (1998), we modify
Eq. 2 to permit the realization of zero trade values. The result is provided as Eq. 3.
eTijt ¼ k Y g1it Y g2jt
GDg3ij
 !
exp CDg4ij b
0Zij  h
 
ð3Þ
η is a fixed amount of trade that is subtracted from the level predicted by Eq. 2.
When the latent trade values are negative, observed imports and/or exports will be
zero. Thus, the observed data on country i’s imports from or exports to country j can
be described as Tijt ¼ max ~Tijt; 0
 
. Substituting this identity, expanding the variables
in the vector Zij, reintroducing time subscripts where appropriate, taking natural
logarithms of the continuous variables on both sides of the resulting equation, and
assuming that εijt is an identically and independently distributed error term results in
our estimation equation:
ln Tijt þ h
  ¼ k þ a1 lnCDij þ a2 ln IMijt þ a3i ln IMijt  lnCDij  OECDi þ a4iOECDi
þa5Yjt þ a6 lnGDij þ a7Δ lnXRATEijt þ a8 lnOPENijt þ a9 lnPOPjt
þa10 lnREMjt þ a11BORDERij þ a12COMLANGij þ a13FTAijt þ a14OPECjt
þa15SEAPORTj þ b4 t 4 t þ "ijt
ð4Þ
Our vector of dependent variables includes aggregate import and export values as
well as disaggregated (non-manufactured and manufactured goods and one-digit
SITC level) import and export values, each of which is regressed in turn on our set
of explanatory variables. All trade data are from the SourceOECD database (OECD
2007) and measure trade in goods.
To capture other possible time-invariant country-specific heterogeneity that yields
variation in trade flows, we include a vector of country-specific dummy variables,
OECDi, that identify each member of our OECD country cohort. Since a number of
studies report that immigrants act to increase their host countries’ imports from and
exports to their home countries, we also include the immigrant stock variable, IMijt,
and a series of terms that interact the cultural distance, immigrant stock and OECD
(i.e., immigrants’ host) country dummy variables.2 Thus, our empirical specification
allows for variation in the influences of cultural distance across our reference OECD
countries while controlling for the role that immigrants may play in influencing trade
flows between their home and host countries through their connections to social and/
or business networks, their abilities to offset information asymmetries and via their
preferences for home country-produced goods. In Eq. 4, α1 and α2 are estimates of
the “base effects” of cultural distance and immigrants, respectively, that apply
equally across OECD country–country j pairs. The coefficients on the terms that
interact the CDij, IMijt and variables OECDi variables, α3i, capture any variation
from the corresponding base effect that is specific to each of the reference OECD
2 “Appendix 2” provides details regarding data sources and the construction of the immigrant stock series.
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countries.3 Thus, the proportional influence of cultural distance on trade for each
reference country is given by the sum of the coefficients on the cultural distance
variable, a^1, and the corresponding interaction term, a^3i.
3.1 Measuring cultural distance
Inglehart et al. (2004) defines cultural distance as the degree to which shared norms
and values between people in one country differ from those in another country.
Using data from the WVS and the EVS (Inglehart et al. 2004; Hagenaars et al.
2003), we calculate the cultural distance between each of the nine OECD reference
countries and each of the remaining countries in our sample.4 Conducted between
1998 and 2001, the surveys provide standardized data from representative national
samples for a broad and varying set of topics that relate to economics, politics,
religion, sexual behavior, gender roles, family values, communal identities, civic
engagement, ethical concerns, environmental protection, and scientific and techno-
logical progress (Inglehart et al. 2004). Since the surveys were not conducted on an
annual basis, our measure of cultural distance is time-invariant. Guiso et al. (2005),
Linders et al. (2005) and Boisso and Ferrantino (1997) also employ time-invariant
measures of cultural differences. Following the leads of these prior studies, we
assume that any relative changes in national cultures that occurred during the 6-year
period that our data represents were negligible.
Employing factor analysis, Inglehart et al. (2004) classify survey respondents
along two dimensions of culture: traditional vs. secular-rational authority (TSR) and
survival vs. self-expression values (SSE). The TSR dimension reflects the contrast
between societies in which deference to the authority of a God, the nation or to the
family is considered important or an expectation and those societies in which
individualism and self-expression are stressed. Traditional authority emphasizes
obedience to religious authority, adherence to family or communal obligations,
national pride and norms of sharing. It is common for members of such societies to
view large families and large numbers of children as positive, or desirable,
achievements. Divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide are all viewed in a very
negative light. Members of secular-rational societies tend to hold opposing views on
these topics. Secular-rational societies adhere to rational-legal norms and tend to
emphasize economic accumulation and individual achievement. The SSE dimension
of culture, on the other hand, reflects differences between societies that emphasize
hard work and self-denial (survival values) and those that place greater emphasis on
quality of life issues, such as women’s emancipation and equal status for racial and
sexual minorities (self-expression values). Societies in which individuals focus more
on survival tend to emphasize economic and physical security more than autonomy.
Generally speaking, members of these societies find foreigners and outsiders, ethnic
diversity, and cultural change to be threatening. This correlates with an intolerance
of homosexuals and minorities, adherence to traditional gender roles, and an
4 The number of trading partners in our analysis is determined by the availability of data on cultural
distance. On average, the values surveys provide data for 1,121 residents of each nation in our sample.
3 The effect of immigrants on trade between each OECD country–country j pairing can be computed
similarly.
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authoritarian political outlook. Members of societies in which self-expression values
are emphasized tend to hold opposing preferences on these issues.
We employ average TSR and SSE values to calculate the cultural distances between
each of our nine OECD reference countries and the remaining countries in our data
set. The resulting values, calculated as CDij ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
TSRj  TSRi
 2þ SSEj  SSEi 2q ,
are presented in Table 1. The greatest reported cultural distance is between Sweden
and Morocco (3.96), while the two most culturally-similar countries are Canada and
the US (0.25), an indication of the heterogeneity of cultural (dis)similarity among our
reference OECD countries. While the US and Canada are the most culturally-similar
pair of countries in our sample, the cultural distances of the US and Canada from the
remaining countries in our sample are quite different, indicating that any two
culturally-similar countries are not necessarily equidistant from a given third country.
While the cultural distance rankings generally conform to expectations, it is important
to note, however, that the values are estimates and, as such, strict ordinal interpretation
of the rankings may prove problematic.
3.2 Additional variables in the empirical model
The remaining explanatory variables in Eq. 4 are standard in most studies that apply
the gravity specification to trade flows.5 The annual change in the exchange rate,
XRATEijt, captures terms of trade effects. Expressed for each OECD member country–
country j pairing, as foreign currency units per unit of the OECD country’s currency,
an increase in the variable is expected to decrease the OECD member’s exports to
country j and increase that country’s imports from country j. OPENjt, the sum of each
country’s imports and exports divided by its GDP, measures the general propensity to
trade. To represent market size, we include a variable that indicates the population of
each country j (POPjt). Controlling for each country’s relative lack of trading
opportunities, we follow Wagner et al. (2002) and include a measure of economic
remoteness, given as REMjt ¼ 1

PK
k¼1
Ykt=Ywtð Þ

GDjk
 
, where Ywt represents gross
global product and k identifies the availability of potential trading partners for country
j other than our nine reference OECD countries. As the annual GDP values (included
in Eq. 3) for the reference OECD countries do not vary across trading partners, in our
estimation equation the related effects are subsumed into the coefficients on the
OECDi dummy variables.
A number of dummy variables are also included in our regression specification.
As common language has been identified as an important determinant of trade flows
(Dunlevy 2006; Hutchinson 2002), we include a dummy variable which is equal to
one if the predominant language used in the respective OECD country is also
commonly used in country j (CIA 2006). As being landlocked is an important
geographic impediment to trade, we include a dummy variable, SEAPORTj, which is
equal to one if country j has direct access to international waters. Similarly,
BORDERij is equal to one for OECD country–country j pairs that are geographically
adjacent. Capturing the effects of trade agreements FTAijt is equal to one if the
5 “Appendix 3” lists the variables, corresponding data sources and additional notes.
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Table 1 Cultural distances between country pairs
Cultural distance between OECD member and
Country Australia Canada Denmark Germany Italy Netherlands Norway Sweden US
Albania 1.58 1.61 2.02 1.24 0.94 1.82 1.73 2.33 1.54
Algeria 1.89 1.83 2.63 2.09 1.45 2.38 2.34 2.97 1.64
Argentina 1.09 1.04 1.88 1.54 0.75 1.62 1.61 2.22 0.85
Armenia 1.77 1.83 2.06 1.16 1.12 1.90 1.78 2.35 1.79
Australia 0.00 0.16 0.93 1.21 0.65 0.67 0.74 1.25 0.39
Austria 0.34 0.48 0.81 0.88 0.42 0.56 0.55 1.16 0.63
Azerbaijan 1.87 1.89 2.35 1.56 1.26 2.15 2.07 2.67 1.79
Bangladesh 1.80 1.76 2.51 1.95 1.34 2.27 2.23 2.85 1.58
Belgium 0.63 0.77 0.87 0.60 0.33 0.66 0.58 1.21 0.88
Brazil 1.42 1.36 2.20 1.78 1.05 1.95 1.92 2.54 1.16
Bulgaria 1.93 2.01 2.04 1.06 1.30 1.92 1.79 2.29 2.01
Canada 0.16 0.00 1.08 1.36 0.72 0.82 0.90 1.39 0.25
Chile 1.21 1.16 1.98 1.59 0.83 1.73 1.70 2.32 0.97
China 2.07 2.18 1.96 0.97 1.50 1.90 1.75 2.15 2.23
Colombia 1.85 1.73 2.76 2.58 1.76 2.50 2.53 3.10 1.48
Croatia 1.00 1.05 1.48 0.90 0.36 1.27 1.19 1.81 1.01
Czech Republic 1.27 1.42 1.04 0.06 0.89 0.99 0.83 1.27 1.54
Denmark 0.93 1.08 0.00 1.00 1.18 0.26 0.29 0.34 1.32
Dominican Republic 1.23 1.16 2.03 1.67 0.90 1.77 1.76 2.37 0.96
Egypt 1.64 1.57 2.44 2.01 1.28 2.18 2.16 2.78 1.36
El Salvador 2.33 2.18 3.25 3.17 2.33 2.99 3.04 3.57 1.94
Estonia 1.84 1.94 1.90 0.92 1.23 1.80 1.66 2.15 1.96
Finland 0.60 0.75 0.68 0.62 0.51 0.47 0.39 1.01 0.91
France 0.71 0.82 1.02 0.62 0.23 0.81 0.73 1.35 0.89
Germany 1.21 1.36 1.00 0.00 0.84 0.93 0.78 1.23 1.48
Greece 0.80 0.90 1.11 0.61 0.24 0.91 0.83 1.44 0.95
Hungary 1.69 1.75 1.98 1.10 1.04 1.82 1.71 2.28 1.71
Iceland 0.30 0.47 0.65 0.98 0.65 0.38 0.44 0.99 0.69
India 1.09 1.08 1.73 1.24 0.55 1.49 1.44 2.07 0.97
Indonesia 1.59 1.56 2.28 1.72 1.10 2.04 1.99 2.62 1.39
Ireland 0.75 0.64 1.65 1.60 0.77 1.39 1.42 1.99 0.40
Israel 0.79 0.87 1.20 0.72 0.16 0.99 0.91 1.53 0.90
Italy 0.65 0.72 1.18 0.84 0.00 0.94 0.89 1.52 0.73
Japan 1.35 1.51 0.89 0.31 1.10 0.91 0.76 1.05 1.67
Jordan 2.00 1.94 2.74 2.20 1.57 2.50 2.46 3.09 1.74
Korea, Republic of 1.55 1.63 1.75 0.84 0.91 1.60 1.48 2.03 1.62
Latvia 1.85 1.92 2.06 1.13 1.20 1.92 1.80 2.34 1.90
Lithuania 1.68 1.76 1.84 0.90 1.04 1.71 1.58 2.11 1.76
Luxembourg 0.64 0.79 0.73 0.57 0.47 0.53 0.44 1.06 0.93
Macedonia, FYR 2.20 2.25 2.50 1.58 1.55 2.34 2.23 2.78 2.18
Mexico 1.08 0.98 1.97 1.80 0.96 1.70 1.72 2.31 0.75
Morocco 2.85 2.78 3.62 3.05 2.45 3.37 3.34 3.96 2.56
Netherlands 0.67 0.82 0.26 0.93 0.94 0.00 0.16 0.60 1.06
New Zealand 0.32 0.48 0.62 0.98 0.67 0.36 0.42 0.96 0.71
Nigeria 1.66 1.56 2.52 2.21 1.43 2.26 2.26 2.87 1.33
Norway 0.74 0.90 0.29 0.78 0.89 0.16 0.00 0.63 1.12
Pakistan 1.94 1.89 2.66 2.10 1.48 2.42 2.38 3.00 1.70
Peru 1.44 1.38 2.20 1.76 1.04 1.95 1.92 2.54 1.19
Philippines 1.39 1.35 2.13 1.66 0.96 1.88 1.85 2.47 1.16
Poland 1.40 1.39 2.03 1.44 0.86 1.80 1.74 2.37 1.26
Portugal 1.21 1.20 1.87 1.35 0.69 1.63 1.58 2.21 1.06
Romania 2.04 2.07 2.47 1.63 1.41 2.29 2.19 2.78 1.97
Russian Federation 2.17 2.25 2.31 1.33 1.53 2.19 2.06 2.56 2.23
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OECD member and country j are parties to the same trade agreement during year t.
OPECjt controls for petroleum imports and is equal to one if country j was an OPEC
member for at least 6 months during year t. Coefficients on the year dummy
variables, Ωt, represent the effects of changes in country-specific economic policies
that may influence levels of trade.
We expect the signs of the coefficient estimates for geodesic distance and cultural
distance to be negative. With the exception of the coefficients on the annual changes
in the OECD member country–country j exchange rate, OPEC membership and the
economic remoteness of each country, which could take either positive or negative
values depending on the measure of trade employed as the dependent variable,
following the standard literature a priori we expect all other coefficients to be
positive.
4 Empirical results and discussion
4.1 Heterogeneity of the reference countries
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample and for each of the reference
OECD countries, ordered by average cultural distance from the trading partners in
our data set. We find that Italy, followed by the US and Australia, are the least
culturally-distant countries with average cultural distance values varying from 0.998
(Italy) to 1.316 (Australia). All three countries have values that are significantly less
than the average for the full sample. With cultural distance values of 2.062 and
1.749, Sweden and Denmark, respectively, are the most culturally-distant from the
trading partners considered. Average cultural distance values for Canada, Germany,
Norway and the Netherlands are not significantly different from that of the full
Table 1 (continued)
Cultural distance between OECD member and
Country Australia Canada Denmark Germany Italy Netherlands Norway Sweden US
Slovak Republic 1.26 1.36 1.45 0.60 0.65 1.30 1.18 1.75 1.38
Slovenia 1.14 1.27 1.14 0.27 0.65 1.02 0.88 1.41 1.35
South Africa 1.33 1.28 2.09 1.66 0.93 1.84 1.81 2.43 1.09
Spain 0.81 0.89 1.24 0.75 0.17 1.03 0.95 1.58 0.90
Sweden 1.25 1.39 0.34 1.23 1.52 0.60 0.63 0.00 1.64
Switzerland 0.60 0.75 0.63 0.64 0.56 0.42 0.34 0.96 0.93
Tanzania 1.70 1.61 2.55 2.21 1.44 2.29 2.29 2.89 1.38
Turkey 1.73 1.72 2.34 1.68 1.18 2.12 2.05 2.67 1.57
Uganda 1.67 1.62 2.41 1.89 1.24 2.16 2.13 2.75 1.43
Ukraine 2.08 2.15 2.26 1.30 1.44 2.13 2.00 2.53 2.13
UK 0.20 0.35 0.73 1.13 0.72 0.47 0.56 1.05 0.59
US 0.39 0.25 1.32 1.48 0.73 1.06 1.12 1.64 0.00
Uruguay 0.86 0.90 1.42 0.95 0.25 1.19 1.13 1.76 0.85
Venezuela 1.25 1.14 2.14 1.96 1.13 1.88 1.90 2.48 0.90
Vietnam 1.31 1.27 2.05 1.60 0.88 1.80 1.77 2.39 1.09
Zimbabwe 2.06 2.02 2.76 2.15 1.58 2.52 2.47 3.10 1.84
See text for details regarding calculation of cultural distances
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B. Tadesse, R. White
sample. Based on this ordering and the corresponding incidence of significance from
the full sample average, we can say that Canada, Germany, Norway and the
Netherlands are culturally closer to the remaining countries in our data set than are
Denmark and Sweden, while Italy, the US and Australia are culturally closer to the
remaining countries than are Canada, Germany, Norway and the Netherlands.
We also observe that while the average geodesic distances of both the US
(8,228 km) and Italy (8,736 km) from the remaining countries are not significantly
different from one another, the US and Australia both trade (import as well as export)
more with the countries in our sample than do relatively culturally-distant countries
such as Sweden and Denmark. With respect to the number of immigrants residing in
each of the reference OECD countries, the US is home to significantly more
immigrants while Italy and the more culturally-distant countries (i.e., Norway, the
Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden) have significantly fewer immigrants compared to
the overall average value. Not surprisingly, the US is also an outlier in terms of its
average GDP value. In addition to examining whether or not cultural differences affect
trade flows, heterogeneities such as these permit us to test the consistency of the
influences of cultural distance on trade across our reference countries.
4.2 Cross-border trade-inhibiting and facilitating factors
Table 3 presents coefficients (marginal effects) for estimations that employ, as
dependent variables, aggregate and disaggregated (manufactured and non-manufac-
tured goods) trade values.6 We derive the estimates using a Tobit specification as in
Eaton and Tamura (1994) and Head and Ries (1998). Results indicate that the signs
of most coefficients correspond with our a priori expectations. Accordingly,
increased geodesic distance and depreciation of each country’s currency vis-à-vis
each respective OECD reference countries’ currency corresponds to declines in
exports and increases in the aggregate as well as disaggregated (manufactured and
non-manufactured goods) imports of the OECD countries considered. Consistent
with the predictions of the theoretical gravity model, with increases in the incomes
of trading partners we observe increases in the level of trade, with estimated
coefficients lying below unity across all estimations. We also find that shared
borders, larger populations (a proxy for market size), sharing a common language,
having access to international waters, and being parties to a free trade agreement
increase our reference countries’ exports and imports at both the aggregate level and
for the disaggregated measures of trade. Coefficients on the trade openness variable
are generally positive and are significant with respect to aggregate imports and
imports of non-manufactured goods. On the other hand, our OECD reference
countries tend to trade less with countries that are more economically remote and
those that are OPEC members. The notable exception is the case where trade in non-
manufactured goods is considered; however, this is intuitive as our OECD countries’
primary import from OPEC members is petroleum, which is classified as part of the
SITC-3 (mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials) industry classification.
6 We also estimate the relationship using the Random Effects Generalized Least Squares approach. The
results do not differ from those presented here.
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Table 3 Aggregate, non-manufactured and manufactured goods imports and exports-tobit coefficients
Dep. variable: ln importsijt ln non-manuf.
importsijt
ln manuf.
importsijt
ln exportsijt ln non-manuf.
exportsijt
ln manuf.
exportsijt
ln cultural distanceij −0.7758a
(0.2313)
−0.6172b
(0.2739)
−1.2148a
(0.2467)
−0.1655
(0.1978)
−1.235a
(0.2308)
−0.1035
(0.196)
ln immigrantsijt 0.2107
a
(0.0258)
0.2758a
(0.0306)
0.222a
(0.0275)
0.2443a
(0.0221)
0.1454a
(0.0257)
0.2673a
(0.0219)
ln immigrantsijt ×
ln cultural distanceij ×
host country: Australia
0.0607
(0.0376)
0.1066b
(0.0446)
0.0498
(0.0401)
0.1101a
(0.0322)
0.2592a
(0.0375)
0.0614c
(0.0319)
ln immigrantsijt ×
ln cultural distanceij ×
host country: Canada
0.062c
(0.0371)
0.0015
(0.0439)
0.1082a
(0.0396)
−0.0543c
(0.0317)
−.1742a
(0.037)
−0.1129a
(0.0315)
ln immigrantsijt ×
ln cultural distanceij ×
host country: Denmark
−0.0867b
(0.0409)
−0.1183b
(0.0484)
−0.0232
(0.0436)
−0.1248a
(0.0349)
0.0166
(0.0408)
−0.1259a
(0.0346)
ln immigrantsijt ×
ln cultural distanceij ×
host country: Germany
0.0375
(0.0375)
0.0735c
(0.0444)
0.0495
(0.04)
0.0091
(0.032)
0.1276a
(0.0374)
0.0007
(0.0318)
ln immigrantsijt ×
ln cultural distanceij ×
host country:
The Netherlands
0.0231
(0.0349)
−0.013
(0.0413)
0.071c
(0.0372)
−0.0892a
(0.0298)
0.0572c
(0.0348)
−0.1052a
(0.0296)
ln immigrantsijt ×
ln cultural distanceij ×
host country: Norway
−0.0865b
(0.0364)
−0.1499a
(0.0431)
−0.0941b
(0.0388)
−0.2444a
(0.0311)
−0.0661c
(0.0363)
−0.2596a
(0.0309)
ln immigrantsijt ×
ln cultural distanceij ×
host country: Sweden
−0.0167
(0.0393)
−0.0099
(0.0466)
−0.0307
(0.0419)
−0.0435
(0.0336)
0.0655c
(0.0392)
−0.0543
(0.0333)
ln immigrantsijt ×
ln cultural distanceij ×
host country: US
0.0861b
(0.0352)
−0.0154
(0.0417)
0.1468a
(0.0376)
−0.0362
(0.0301)
0.2222a
(0.0352)
−0.0728b
(0.0299)
Δ ln exchange rateijt 0.4108
a
(0.1434)
0.4469a
(0.1697)
0.5933a
(0.153)
−0.342a
(0.1227)
−0.6029a
(0.1432)
−0.1892
(0.1216)
ln geodesic distanceij −0.3989a
(0.042)
−0.0796
(0.0497)
−0.5593a
(0.0448)
−0.4641a
(0.0359)
−0.6899a
(0.0419)
−0.4411a
(0.0356)
ln GDPjt 0.8615
a
(0.0562)
0.8558a
(0.0665)
0.9671a
(0.06)
0.6104a
(0.0481)
0.6428a
(0.0561)
0.5983a
(0.0476)
ln trade opennessjt 0.3635
a
(0.0727)
−0.0275
(0.0861)
0.9783a
(0.0776)
0.047
(0.0622)
0.1078
(0.0726)
0.0584
(0.0616)
ln populationjt 0.0631
c
(0.034)
−0.0801b
(0.0403)
0.119a
(0.0363)
0.0546c
(0.0291)
0.029
(0.034)
0.0484c
(0.0288)
ln economic remotenessjt −0.078
(0.0492)
0.1274b
(0.0582)
−0.1452a
(0.0525)
−0.1688a
(0.0421)
−0.1421a
(0.0491)
−0.2011a
(0.0417)
Shared borderij 0.7473
a
(0.1621)
1.2788a
(0.1918)
0.4321b
(0.1729)
0.8551a
(0.1386)
0.9957a
(0.1617)
0.7551a
(0.1373)
Common languageij 0.2724
a
(0.0783)
0.3915a
(0.0927)
0.195b
(0.0835)
0.3032a
(0.0669)
0.2664a
(0.0781)
0.4306a
(0.0663)
FTAijt 0.2273
b
(0.09)
0.4192a
(0.1065)
0.2436b
(0.096)
0.2241a
(0.077)
0.4639a
(0.0898)
0.1524b
(0.0763)
OPECj −0.2795b
(0.1267)
0.9305a
(0.15)
−2.2475a
(0.1352)
−0.1036
(0.1084)
0.3211b
(0.1264)
−0.2759a
(0.1074)
Seaportj 0.9291
a
(0.0813)
1.2957a
(0.0964)
1.0264a
(0.0867)
0.7254a
(0.0695)
0.9805a
(0.0811)
0.6387a
(0.0689)
Constant −7.1652a
(1.7233)
−11.9943a
(2.0398)
−8.765a
(1.8382)
0.3432
(1.474)
0.2197
(1.7191)
0.6089
(1.4605)
N 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618
Pseudo-R2 0.25 0.19 0.26 0.27 0.22 0.28
Adjusted R2 0.73 0.67 0.68 0.74 0.65 0.73
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4.3 Does cultural distance influence trade?
To determine whether cultural distance affects trade flows, we refer to the
coefficients on the cultural distance variables. The signs of the corresponding
coefficients, presented in Table 3, indicate that a rise in the degree to which the
shared norms and values of people in one country differ from those in another
country, a proxy for the lack of a minimum reservoir of trust and commitments
required to complete cross-border trade deals, diminish our OECD countries’
imports to a significant degree; however, for exports, while coefficients are negative
across all estimations, cultural distance appears to only inhibit trade in non-
manufactured goods. Given that we employ the Tobit technique when estimating our
model, resulting coefficients are not true elasticities. However, as the corresponding
proportionality coefficients (κ) are small relative to the median exports or imports of
each country, following Head and Ries (1998), we can heuristically interpret the
coefficients as elasticity estimates. Accordingly, a 1% increase in the cultural
distance between our reference OECD countries and their respective trading partners
would reduce aggregate imports of the typical OECD country by 0.7758%. When
disaggregated imports are considered, the trade-inhibiting influence of cultural
distance is estimated to be 1.215% for imports of manufactured goods and 0.617%
for imports of non-manufactured goods. Typically, however, our reference countries
are heterogeneous in terms of their respective cultural distances from the trading
partners considered and their socio-economic characteristics that facilitate or inhibit
their trade flows; hence, the conclusion that cultural distance will have influences
similar to that reflected by the “base effect” on country-specific trade (as indicated
above) is erroneous. Below we highlight the variation in and quantify the effects of
cultural distance on trade across our reference countries and disaggregated measures
of trade.
4.3.1 Proportional effects of cultural distance on trade across OECD countries
As our objective is to examine whether cultural distance affects trade flows and, if
so, to quantify any variation in the effects across countries and thereby evaluate the
consistency of the effects, we derive country-specific sensitivities (elasticities) of
trade measures with respect to changes in the cultural distance variable by using the
sum of the coefficients on the cultural distance variable (CDij) and the terms that
Table 3 (continued)
Dep. variable: ln importsijt ln non-manuf.
importsijt
ln manuf.
importsijt
ln exportsijt ln non-manuf.
exportsijt
ln manuf.
exportsijt
Log-likelihood −6,984 −7,551 −7,207 −6,433 −6,973 −6,399
LR statistic 4,606a 3,506a 5,008a 4,758a 4,005a 5,098a
Coefficients on dummy variables representing years and host countries not reported
a Statistical significance from the zero at the 1% level
b Statistical significance from the zero at the 5% level
c Statistical significance from the zero at the 10% level
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interact the cultural distance variable with the stock of immigrants from each home
country (IMijt) and the reference OECD country-specific dummy (OECDi) variables.
As mentioned, the coefficient on the cultural distance variable captures the base effects
of cultural distance on the trade measures employed, while the coefficients on the
interaction terms capture variation from the base effect. The sum of the estimated base
effect and the coefficients on the interaction terms thus gives the proportional effects
of each country’s cultural distance on the respective measures of trade. Table 4
presents estimated country-specific proportional effects of cultural distance on imports
of aggregate, manufactured and non-manufactured goods, as well as for each of the
SITC one-digit industry sub-classifications of aggregate imports by our country of
reference, computed and presented in the increasing order of each country’s average
cultural distance from the trading partners in our data set.
For each case, the proportional country-specific marginal effects of cultural distance
are presented, starting with aggregate imports, followed by imports of non-
manufactured goods and corresponding industry sub-classifications (SITC-0 to
SITC-4), and ending with the effect on imports of manufactured goods and its sub-
classifications (SITC-5 to SITC-9). Comparing proportional effects across reference
countries and industry categories, we observe an interesting contrast: First, with
increasing cultural distance, each country’s aggregate and disaggregated imports of
manufactured as well as non-manufactured goods significantly diminishes. Second, we
observe that the trade-inhibiting effects of cultural distance appear to vary with the
degree of the differences in shared norms and values between reference countries’ and
their trading partners; however, the effect does not always follow the increasing/
decreasing order of average cultural distance. For example, while a 10% increase in
cultural distance is estimated to decrease aggregate imports from 6.897% for the US,
7.138% for Canada and 7.15% for Australia, a similar 10% increase in the degree to
which shared norms and values among people in each of Denmark, Sweden and
Norway differ from those in other trading partners, would lead to an 8.6% fall in the
imports of both Denmark and Norway and decrease Sweden’s imports by 7.9%. Third,
while the proportional effect of cultural distance appears to be larger and more elastic
with respect to imports of manufactured goods than of non-manufactured goods, the
sensitivity of the effect is, in general, estimated to be near unity (i.e., unitary elastic).
Among non-manufactured goods, we find that imports of SITC-4 industries (animal
and vegetable oils, fats and waxes) followed by SITC-2 industries (crude materials,
inedible, except fuels) and SITC-0 industries (food and live animals) exhibit the
highest sensitivity to equal percentage increases in cultural distance.
Table 5 presents the corresponding effects of cultural distance on each of the
export measures employed in our estimations. Despite the insignificant coefficient
on the cultural distance variable in the aggregate exports regression, computation of
proportional country-specific and one-digit SITC industry-specific effects reveals
that the degree to which shared norms and values among people in one country
differ from those in other nations have substantial export-inhibiting effects, although
with varying magnitudes. While the trade-inhibiting effect of cultural dissimilarity
between nations is significant only with respect to the aggregate exports of Norway,
we observe that it has significant negative effects, for each of the reference countries,
on exports of manufactured goods in general, for the corresponding industry sub-
classifications and for three (SITC-2, SITC-3, and SITC-4) of the non-manufactured
B. Tadesse, R. White
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goods sub-classifications. We also find that the effects of cultural distance are more
pronounced for exports of manufactured goods.
In Tables 4 and 5, we observe negative and significant effects of cultural distance
on imports regardless of the trade measure employed as the dependent variable;
however, the same pattern of significance is not found when we consider the influence
of cultural distance on exports. Across all OECD reference countries, the estimated
effects of cultural distance are negative for aggregate, non-manufactured and
manufactured goods exports, yet we find consistent statistical significance, across
our cohort of OECD countries, only when exports of non-manufactured goods are
employed as the dependent variable. Considering the effects reported for each one-
digit SITC classification provides greater insight into the lack of a consistent negative
and significant cultural distance effect. In Table 5, we see a consistently negative and
significant influence of cultural distance among manufactured goods (i.e., SITC-5,
SITC-6 and SITC-8 levels of detail). Aggregation to include exports of all
manufactured goods (i.e. SITC-5 through SITC-9) results in much of the statistical
significance being lost. Similarly, aggregation across all SITC classifications, to the
aggregate exports level of detail, results in a general loss of statistical significance.
Our results suggest that the effects of cultural distance vary across countries and, at
times, across a given country’s exports and imports, whether at the aggregate or
disaggregated levels of detail. While empirically verifiable accounts of the reasons for
the variation in such effects across product types is not possible based on our current
analysis, plausible reasons for the differences in the sensitivity of different goods to
cultural distance may include differences in the responsiveness of consumers of
different products to transaction costs that may be attributed to cultural differences and
demonstration effects as well as to variation in the importance of each product
classification relative to the corresponding aggregate export and import demand
functions. Similarly, differences in the sensitivity of imports and exports to cultural
distance across the one-digit SITC sub-classifications may result from differences in
the cultural values and attitudes embedded in the different products. From the results
reported, we can conclude that cultural distance does inhibit both imports and exports;
however, the effects appear to be more consistent for imports than for exports.
Given the observed heterogeneities in the socio-economic characteristics of our cohort
of OECD members, particularly in terms of their economic sizes, highlighting the
economic significance of the effects of cultural distance on trade is warranted. In Table 6,
we present the effect (in dollar terms) of an assumed 1% increase in the average cultural
distance value for each reference country on the corresponding measures of trade. The
effects are derived using the average annual values of each country’s trade, presented in
Table 2, and estimated proportional cultural distance coefficients that are presented in
Tables 4 and 5. In order to facilitate comparison across countries that vary in their
economic size, we also present the percentage values of the effects of cultural distance
computed relative to the average annual values of each country’s corresponding
measure of trade. The figures in the table indicate that a 1% increase in the average
cultural distance of each reference country reduces their respective annual average trade
values by an amount that varies from as low as $174,533 for Australia’s exports of
manufactured goods to as high as $140.5 million for US average annual imports of
manufactured goods. Comparing these values to each country’s observed average
annual trade, we find that cultural dissimilarities between nations reduces the level of
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trade by as much as 2.57% (Sweden’s imports of manufactured goods), clearly
indicating that differences in shared norms and values among people in different
countries have statistically significant economic effects on trade flows.
4.4 Immigrants, cultural distance and trade
While the US and Italy are, on average, the least culturally-distant OECD countries in
our data, they are also hosts to significantly different sizes of immigrant populations.
Values presented in Table 2 indicate that, with an average immigrant stock of 314,454,
the US immigrant population exceeds, by far, the full sample average and thus that of
Italy (12,520). Although it is not the principle objective of this paper, our analysis
permits us to ask whether, and to what extent, immigrants act to offset the trade-
inhibiting effects of cultural distance. The coefficients on the immigrant stock
variables are positive and significant in all estimations. The implication is that through
the use of their superior knowledge about their host and home countries, business and
network connections, which help to reduce lax contract enforcement and to satisfy
preferences for home goods, especially when substitutes are not available in their host
countries, immigrants exert pro-export and pro-import effects in nearly all of our
reference countries. The degree to which the pro-trade effects of immigrants offset the
trade-inhibiting effects of cultural distance can be observed from the signs and
magnitudes of the coefficients on the interaction terms: a^3i. From Table 3, while the
negative sign of a^1 indicates the trade-inhibiting effect of cultural distance, the positive
sign of a^2 indicates the pro-trade effect of immigrants. Wherever a^3i is positive and
significant, we can conclude that the pro-trade effects of immigrants offset the trade-
inhibiting effects of cultural distance observed in the particular reference country.
Accordingly, we find that immigrants are able to offset the trade-inhibiting effects
of cultural distance in Australia (on imports of non-manufactured goods and exports
of aggregate, manufactured and non-manufactured goods), Canada (on imports of
aggregate and manufactured goods), Germany (on exports as well as imports of non-
manufactured goods), and the US (for aggregate and manufactured goods imports as
well as exports of non-manufactured goods). In all other countries and for all other
measures of trade, the trade-inhibiting effects of cultural distance are so large that
corresponding coefficients on the interaction terms are consistently negative, indicating
an inability of immigrants to offset the trade-inhibiting effects of differences in shared
norms and values among people in different countries.
5 Conclusions
Driven in part by the increased integration of economies, the fragmentation of
production processes often designed to take advantage of differences in resource
endowments, the development of new technologies, variation in comparative advantage
across stages of production, and increased use of the Internet, the volume of trade that
involves individuals from politically- and culturally-distinct nations has been on the
rise. Using bilateral trade data that span the years 1996–2001 for nine OECD reference
countries and 58 other countries for which cultural distances can be calculated, and
after accounting for standard trade facilitating/inhibiting variables often included in
Does Cultural Distance Hinder Trade in Goods? A Comparative Study...
empirical trade studies, we show that cultural dissimilarity has a statistically significant
and economically considerable negative influence on the volume of trade flows. While
varying in magnitudes, observed effects are consistent across our set of OECD
reference countries for aggregate, manufactured, and non-manufactured goods as well
as for one-digit SITC-level disaggregated measures of trade. We also document that
immigrants exert economically significant pro-trade effects; however, their ability to
offset the trade-inhibiting effects of cultural dissimilarity is limited.
Our findings have important policy implications: First, econometrically, estimates
from prior studies, in which the effect of cultural distance on trade is not accounted
for may be biased. Second, the consistently negative influence of cultural distance on
trade in goods across our heterogonous cohort of OECD countries indicates that,
while attempting to increase the volume of international trade undertaken by their
constituencies, policymakers may wish to seek ways and means for reducing the
costs associated with the building the trust and commitments necessary to initiate
and complete trade deals. Lastly, immigrants play greater roles in facilitating trade
than is usually discussed in the literature: often fully or partially offsetting the
influences of cultural dissimilarities between people in their host and home nations.
Given these implications, we believe that our findings will initiate further interest in
this subject among researchers in international trade, sociologists, and economic
geographers. While considering alternative measures of cultural distance, future
research needs to assess the effects at two levels: on the likelihood of trade to occur
and on the intensification of the existing level of trade.
Appendix 1: country listing
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh,
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Jordan, Korea (Rep.), Latvia, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Mexico, Morocco,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom,
United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zimbabwe.
Appendix 2: immigrant stock data and estimate construction
Data for Australia, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the US
represent foreign-born populations by country of birth, while data for Germany and
Italy represent foreign-born populations by country of nationality. Immigrant stock
data are from national statistic agencies and have been compiled by the Migration
Policy Institute (2007). For six of the nine host countries in our data set, Denmark
(Danmarks Statistik), Germany (Statistiches Bundesamt), Italy (Istituto Nazionale di
Statistica), Norway (Statistisk Sentralbyrå), the Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor
de Statistiek) and the US (US Census Bureau), immigrant stock data are complete to
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the extent that the statistical agency provides annual immigrant stock values for the
years 1996–2001. Due to a lack of data, immigrant stock values are estimated
for 1997–2000, for Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics) and Canada
(Statistics Canada), and for 1996–1998 for Sweden (Statistiska Centralbyrån).
Available immigrant stock values are accepted as correct and are employed as
benchmark values. Inflow data (reported along with available stock data by the
noted statistical agencies) is used to estimate stocks for all other years. For
example, immigrant stocks for Canada, for the years 1997–2000, are constructed
as IMijt ¼ IMij1996 þ
Pt
1997
INijt þ rj. INijt is the immigrant inflow from country j to
country i (in this case, Canada) during year t. is an adjustment factor accounting for
return migration and deaths of immigrants during non-benchmark years. The
adjustment factor is the immigrant stock from country j in Canada during 2001 less
the sum of immigrants from country j in Canada in 1996 and the inflow from
country j during the years 1997–2001 divided by five: rj ¼
IMij2001 IMij1996þ
P2001
y¼1997
INijt
 
5 .
Immigrant stock variables for Australia and Sweden are estimated similarly.
Appendix 3
Table 7 Data sources/notes
Variables Sources/notes
Import/export series Source OECD STAN database (OECD 2007): Trade data (in 1,000s of
1995 US dollars) represent trade in goods and are at the aggregate, non-
manufactured, manufactured, and one-digit SITC industry levels of detail
Cultural distance Author’s calculations based on data from the World Values Survey and
European Values Survey (Inglehart et al. 2004 and Hagenaars et al. 2003)
Immigrants Migration Policy Institute (MPI 2007): See “Appendix 2” for a listing of
host country national statistical agencies that provided data to the MPI and
for additional detail regarding construction of the data series
Geodesic distance Authors’ calculations using great circle method; distances are measured in
kilometers between capital cities
Gross domestic product World Development Indicators (World Bank 2006): data are measured in
100,000s of 1995 US dollars
Population World Development Indicators (World Bank 2006): data are measured in
1,000s
Trade openness Authors’ calculations based on data from the World Development
Indicators (World Bank 2006)
Economic remoteness Authors’ calculations based on derived great circle distances and data from
the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2006)
Exchange rate International Financial Statistics (IMF 2007) and www.oanda.com
Common language CIA World Factbook (CIA 2006)
FTA (free trade agreements) Trade agreements considered include ANZCERTA, APEC, EFTA, EU/EEC
and NAFTA (Ghosh and Yamarik 2004) as well as Canada-Israel FTA,
Europe Agreements between EU members and candidates for EU
membership (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania), EU–Israel FTA,
EU–Mexico FTA and US–Israel FTA
OPEC www.opec.org
Seaport n.a.
Border n.a.
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